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Abstract
We consider a simple two-country model, where each country produces a consumption good
from a single input. Production takes time, and the model is considered over two consecutive periods.
There are three categories of economic agents, namely factor owners, entrepreneurs, and financial
intermediaries. The latter offers credits to entrepreneurs and are funded by sale internationally
transferable bonds. We assume that the national credit markets are monopolistic but that other
markets are competitive. Exchange rate policy is introduced in two different ways, either as a
market intervention by a government, sustained by intervention in the commodity market, and, more
realistically, as a policy commitment by the monetary authorities, which in equilibrium is taken into
consideration by the financial intermediary.
The results of the simple model show that an increase in the value of the domestic currency
from an equilibrium position will in most cases decrease aggregate welfare of the country, but it
will improve welfare of the financial intermediaries. Thus, in the simple framework of our model, a
specific sector – and one with a considerable influence on policy choices – stands to gain from this
exchange rate policy.
Keywords: fear of floating, income distribution, financial intermediaries.
JEL classification: F37, F41
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been increasing attention on the role of exchange rate
volatility in the economic performance of developing countries, and there is some evidence
which suggests that these countries are more concerned about stabilizing the exchange
rate than developed countries. There are several papers which show that exchange
rates are more volatile in developing than in developed countries (Calvo and Reinhart
∗ Communicating author: Hans Keiding, Institute of Economics, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K,
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(2002), Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002)). This
behavior, which after Calvo and Reinhart (2002) has been known as “fear of floating”,
does not at a first glance seem to be founded in economic reasoning, and there has been
much discussion on how to interpret and explain the observed phenomena.
Several models have been proposed with this purpose. The first attempt at an
explanation, by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) points to the trading off of seignorage benefits
from inflation against the drawbacks of unexpected inflation. Other authors point to balance
sheet effects,(see e.g. Aghion , Banerjee and Bacchetta (2003)), which are important since
dollar liabilities in the country may lead to bancruptcies; as pointed out by Honig (2004),
many of these dollar liabilities may be domestically contracted in the foreing currency. In
Lahiri and Vegh (2001), fear of floating emerges as an optimal policy given that there are
costs connected with exchange rate fluctuations. Another line of argument is proposed
by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), which explains fear of floating as a problem
of time consistency; while floating exchange rates may be the right policy to induce the
firms to insure against shocks, the floating exchange rate is not optimal when a shock
occurs. Subsequent contributions (Gallego and Jones (2004)) have developed this rational
insurance argument further.
While the theoretical discussion, offering a consistent theoretical framework for the
empirically observed phenomenon, has moved in the direction of rationalizing fear of
floating in the sense of letting it emerge as optimal for society under certain assumptions
on the institutional framework, but has shown a great variety in the type of explanations put
forward, there seems to have been a certain consensus on the basic theoretical framework,
which in most cases is that of international macroeconomics, much in the style of the
exposition in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1986). In particular, there has been no attempts to
go beyond the rather simplistic view of a country as an aggregate entity, consisting of
producers and consumers, for which it makes sense to speak of optimal policies without
further comments on the criteria of optimality.
On the other hand, it is well-known that developing countries, and Latin American
countries in particular, are characterized by a very high degree of income inequality, and
that indeed these countries tend to fall apart in a small upper middle class with a way of
life and an outlook not differing particularly from their counterparts in United States and
Western Europe, and the rest of the population living under very different conditions. It
might therefore be worthwhile to treate specific phenomena of these countries with a much
more direct recourse to their specific characteristics, and this is what we intend to do in this
paper. Incidentally, the paper may also be seen as an attempt to reintroduce the classical
modelling of international trade theory, which have had its impact even on the monetary
aspects of trade, into the current debate on exchange rate regimes.
In order to present the approach in as simple a way as possible, we have chosen
to keep the model as simple as possible without loosing its basic features of following
different types of income receivers. Thus, we consider a world with two countries, each
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producing a single commodity from a single production factor inserted one period earlier.
Domestic markets for factors and for commodities are competitive, and so is the market
for bonds issued by the financial intermediaries in each country, which can be traded in
both countries. However, the financial intermediaries of each country are assumed to have
a monopoly position in the credit markets. We investigate in this model the consequences
of a change in (real) exchange rates in the direction of appreciation of the home currency.
The effects depend on the way in which this policy is carried out, but in the most realistic
of the cases considered, where the declaration of the exchange policy is followed by the
credit evaluation of the financial intermediaries, an exchange rate appreciation will lead
to an increase in the income of the financial intermediaries whereas the position of the
country as a whole will deteriorate.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the basic model and
described the equilibrium, and we consider an example illustrating the situation where
there is government intervention in the domestic commodity market. The more realistic
case of no market intervention is considered in Section 3, where we assume first that
factor markets need not balance, possible due to the possibility of self-employment, and
in Section 4 where we allow for international trade in factors, so that domestic factors
may be reallocated to employment in the foreign country. Section 5 contains conclusions
and suggestions for further research. Some of the details of proofs are collected in a
mathematical appendix.
2. The simple model: first version
In this section we introduce a simple base model of trade over time, where exchange
rates matter. To keep the complexity down to a minimum, we are not considering problems
of comparative advantages and patterns of trade; instead we deal with a two-country, two
commodity world where each country is fully specialized. There is one non-tradable
production factor in each country, which has to be inserted at t = 0, and output x is
available at t = 1 according to a (neoclassical) production function x = f(z) where z is
input; both input and output may be interpreted in per capita terms. The foreign country
produces output xˆ from its input zˆ according to production function fˆ ; as mentioned above,
we assume for simplicity that the countries produce different commodities.
Consumers in each country are divided into three distinct categories, namely (i)
factor owners, (ii) producers, and (iii) financial intermediaries. All consumers carry out
consumption of home and foreign country commodities at t = 1 only, and they have
identical utility functions U(x, xˆ). Factor owners have an endowment of the relevant input
commodity, to be inserted in production at t = 0. The sale of this endowment is saved by
purchase of bonds which are internationally marketable, and the return is for consumption
purchases at t = 1.
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The firms of each country buy input at t = 0, at a price q, and sell output at t = 1, at a
price p. Since the firms have no initial capital, they need to obtain credit with the financial
intermediaries. If the loan rate of interest is rL, then firms’ profit is
π(q, rL) = pf(z)− (1 + rL)qz.
If we assume that factors cannot be traded, and that firms maximize profits at the given
prices and loan rates, we have from the first order conditions that the optimal input z must
satisfy pf ′(z) = (1 + rL)q or, equivalently
rL =
p
q
f ′(z)− 1. (1)
The expression (1) may also be considered as a expressing the demand for loans of the
enterprises.
We assume that in each country, credits can be obtained only from financial
intermediaries of this country. The funding of these credits is obtained by taking deposits
from the public, at an interest rate rD. We assume that the savers of each country have
access not only to the financial intermediaries of its own country but also to those of
the other country, so that the deposit rate rD may be assumed to be identical in the two
countries.
Since our ultimate goal is to study exchange rate policy, we need to introduce the
exchange rate explicitly. Needless to say, the model as outlined is so simple that it does not
provide much rationale for exchange rate policies, but, as we mentioned in the introduction,
the purpose of this section is to exhibit a particular reason for some countries to pursue
a fixed exchange rate policy; we shall later insert our basic model into a more realistic
framework. Thus, at present we let the exchange rate at date t, t = 0, 1 be et (measured
as units of home currency per unit of foreign currency).
Assume from now that et is a policy variable determined by the home country (the
foreign country is passive in this respect, it may be assumed to follow a regime of flexible
exchange rates). Given the exchange rates e0 and e1, consumers i in the home country with
income I choose consumption (xi1, xi2) so as to maximize utility subject to the budget
constraint
pxi1 + e1pˆxi2 = (1− τ)Ii, (2)
where τ is the income tax rate. The income Ii has the form
Ii(p, q, rL, rD) =


qωi(1 + rD) if i is factor owner,
π(q, rL) if i is entrepreneur,
(rL − rD)qz if i is financial intermediary.
(3)
It should be noticed that due to interest rate arbitrage we have
1 + rD = e−10 (1 + rˆD)e1, (4)
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that is return of deposits in home country equals return of placing savings with foreign
country intermediaries.
We have included the possibility of taxation (which will only be used in an example)
to illustrate the workings of exchange rate policy under perfect competition; if all prices
are sufficiently flexible so as to balance supply and demands of goods, factors, and
bonds, then the only way of controlling exchange rates is by operating in the market
(sustaining the home exchange rate by government purchases of home products). We are
not going to investigate this in details, since it is anyway not a realistic policy option, but
we have chosen to include the possibility of such stabilization by allowing for income
taxation. The proceeds of taxation, τ(I1 + I2 + I3), are used for stabilization purposes,
purchasing commodities for storage (which in this simple version just means that they are
not consumed).
An equilibrium (given the exchange rate policy (e0, e1)) is an array
((x0, p, q, rL, rD, e0, e1, τ, x¯1, x¯2), (xˆ0, pˆ, qˆ, rˆL, rˆD))
consisting of consumption, factor prices, and loan rates in each country, such that (here,
only the conditions pertaining to country 1 are stated, those of the other country are similar)
(i) (x0i1, x0i2) maximizes U(xi1, xi2) under the constraints (2) and (3), i = 1, 2, 3.
(ii) financial intermediaries choose rL so as to maximize profits (rL − rD)qz for given
prices and deposit, where the demand for loans is given by (1); first order conditions
for maximum are
f ′(z) + zf ′′(z) =
q
p
(1 + rD), (5)
where z is factor input.
(iii) commodity prices satisfy the arbitrage condition pˆ = e1pˆ, and deposit interest rates
satisfy arbitrage condition (4),
(iv) supply equals demand in all markets,
3∑
i=1
xi1 +
3∑
i=1
xˆi1 = f(ω),
3∑
i=1
xi2 +
3∑
i=1
xˆi2 = fˆ(ωˆ),
(v) income tax revenue covers government purchases: τ(I1 + I2 + I3) ≥ px¯1 + e1pˆx¯2.
Although the model is deliberately kept simple, it is not obvious that an equilbrium
exists, so we insert the following result:
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Theorem 1. In the model considered, assume that:
(a) the utility function is continuous, monotonic and strictly quasi-concave,
(b) the production functions f, fˆ are twice differentiable and concave, and in addition
satisfy neoclassical conditions: f ′(z) →∞ for z → 0, f(z) → 0 for z →∞.
Then for each value of e0, e1 such that e1 does not exceed the marginal rate of substitution
at the point (f(ω), fˆ(ωˆ), there exists an equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in an appendix. At this point, we illustrate the
workings of the model by an example:
Example 1. Assume that ω = ωˆ = 1, that the utility function is U(x1, x2) = x1x2, and
the production functions are
f(z) = z
1
2 , fˆ(zˆ) = zˆ
1
2 .
If we choose e0 = e1 = 1, then obvious candidates for equilibrium prices might be p = pˆ
by condition (iii), and utility maximization gives that total consumption in each country
of each commodity must equal 1/2. We need to find a tax rate τ , factor prices q, qˆ, and
interest rates rL, rˆL and rD (equal to rˆD by (iii)) such that this allocation is sustained in
equilibrium.
We start with a situation where τ = 0. Normalizing by q = qˆ = 1, and setting
rD = 0, we get that the loan rates rD = rˆD can be found from (5), which in this case
becomes
f ′(1) + f ′′(1) =
1
p
or p = 4, and using (1) we obtain that
rL =
4
1
· 1
2
− 1 = 1.
The incomes of the three different types of consumers can be found from (3) as I1 = 1,
I2 = 2, and I3 = 1, and the resulting levels of utility achieved are U(x11, x12) = 164 ,
U(x21, x22) = 116 , U(x31, x32) =
1
64 .
In the example, the deposit rate was set rather arbitrarily to 0. If we instead have
rD = rˆD = 1, then we get p = 8 and rL = 3; the incomes are now I1 = 2, I2 = 4,
I3 = 2, meaning that allocation is unaffected by the change.
Since there are equilibria for any choice of exchange rates, we may now try another
case, namely e0 = 1, e1 = 12 . In this situation, consumers’ choices will be such that
xi2 = 2xi1, xˆi2 = 2xˆi1. We try the interest rate rD = 0 and again let factor price in
country 1 be q = 1, but let qˆ be determined endogenously, since we want p = pˆ (so that
e1 is the real exchange rate). Since e0 = 2e1, we have by (4) that 2(1 + rD) = (1 + rˆD),
so that rD = 0 entails 1 + rˆD = 2. As previously, we can find the loan rate rL and the
commodity price p from (5) and (1), giving p = 4 and rL = 1, as above, leaving I1, I2 and
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I3 unchanged. Using pˆ = 4 and rˆD = 1, we get that qˆ = 1/2 and rˆL = 3 (note that factor
prices are lower but factor owners are compensated by higher interest rates, and similarly,
entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries in the foreigh country end up with unchanged
incomes).
Clearly, since consumers demand the commodities in the ratio 1 : 2, this cannot be an
equilibrium unless the incomes in the home country are suitably restricted. In the foreign
country, consumers facing prices (8, 4) by the aggregate bundle ( 14 ,
1
2 ), and in the home
country, without tax they would buy the bundle ( 12 , 1) (at prices (4, 2) ). To balance the
markets, we need to extract income from home consumers at the tax rate τ = 12 . Since
consumer demand for commodity 1 is then 1/4 in both countries, the remaining demand
must come from the tax revenue 12 ·4 = 2, which exactly matches the remaining production
of commodity 1 at price p = 4. Thus, we have found an equilibrium at the stated exchange
rates.
Due to the (rather large) public intervention needed to reestablish equilibrium, and
the fact that income distribution remains unchanged, the final consumption bundles under
the new exchange rates are inferior than under the old ones. In other cases, however, the
gain from the change in relative prices together with changes in income distribution may
result in improvement of the position of some consumers, even if the overall situation is
one of a welfare loss. This is shown in the next example.
3. The simple model with anticipation of default
In this section we retain most of the features of the simple model considered in the
previous section. However, we change the assumptions on the financial intermediaries
of each country, who now take the default risk into account when offering credits to
the entrepreneurs of their country. To keep the model simple, we assume that financial
intermediaries have a forecast d (respectively, dˆ) of the total demand for the produced
commodity, and that the profits from financial intermediation takes the form
rLd− rDz = (rL d
z
− rD)z,
so that the effective loan rate (giving the return on the total sum of money forwarded to
the entrepreneurs) will increase in the case that production surpasses expected demand.
This new feature of the model is of course a departure from the strictly competitive
framework which characterized the initial version of the model, at least when abstracting
from the monopolistic behaviour in the financial sector. On the other hand, the change
goes in the direction of increased realism, since financial intermediation, and in particular
the credit side of it, involves uncertainty and anticipations in a crucial way (for a discussion
of this, cf. e.g., Freixas and Rochet (1997)).
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Assuming as before that the financial intermediaries choose the loan rate by maxi-
mizing profits subject to the reaction patterns of the entrepreneurs, which are subsumed in
(1), we immediately get that optimal choice of loan rate at the level of anticipated demand
d is found as before when the profit maximizing level of rL does not induce a production
greater than anticipated demand, and
rL =
p
q
f ′(d)− 1 (6)
otherwise.
For the equilibrium, we demand that anticipated demand equals actual demand – thus,
anticipations should be correct in the sense that they are not contradicted by observations
when the latter are available. It is straightforward to check that Theorem 1 carries over to
the present version of the model.
Example 2. We now consider the economy considered in Example 1 under the new
framework, where financial intermediaries anticipate future demand are act accordingly
when granting credits. The usefulness of this behaviour comes to the day when we consider
the case of forced exchange rate change, that is e0 = 1, e1 < 1. We saw in Example 1
that this change in real exchange rates which makes the products of the foreigh country
relatively cheaper, will result in an excess supply of the commodity produced in country 1.
In the previous version of the model, this could be solved only by government purchases,
something which is quite far from real economic life. Now we are able to treat the case
without resort to government intervention in the market, using only the anticipations of
the financial intermediaries.
Let us check the equilibrium belonging to an exchange rate e1 = 0.94868, determined
in such a way that consumers will demand the two commodities in the ratio 1 :
√
0.9, and
in equilibrium, there will be produced at full capacity in country 2 but only 0.9 units of
the commodity in the home country. Setting p = pˆ = 4 and q = qˆ = 1, we get that for
this level of anticipated demand, the loan rate is
rL = 4 · 1√
0.9
− 1 = 1.180819.
Using the arbitrage condition and assuming rˆD = 0, we get that rD = −0.05132 (thus,
in this example we must have a negative rate of interests to avoid arbitrage given that the
domestic currency has been appreciated). The incomes in home country are then
I1 = 3.6− 0.9 · 2.180819 = 1.63726, I2 = 0.9 · 0.94868 = 0.85381
I3 = (1.180819 + 0.05132) · 0.9 = 1.10899.
Comparing with the situation prior to the exchange rate intervention, we first notice that
the terms of trade of the home country have improved; on the other hand the production
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is reduced. With the simple structure of consumer demand chosen in the example –
and what matters here is that all have Cobb-Douglas utility preferences so that there is
a unique period 1 equilibrium for any aggregate production vector – the improvement of
home country welfare due to improved terms of trade is too small compared with the loss
derived from reduced production. Thus, taken as a whole, the home country is worse off.
On the other hand, it is seen that the financiary intermediaries are decidedly better off;
they have a larger nominal income than before, and in addition, the cost of consumption
has decreased, so that real income has increased more than the 45% which is the increase
in nominal income. The conclusion is that the exchange rate policy, which on the face of
it was detrimental to the welfare of the home country, has benefitted at least one group of
income receivers in society.
The case considered in the above example strongly suggests that whereas the gains for
society as a whole from an exchange rate intervention of the type considered is ambiguous
and in many cases a loss rather than a gain, the financial intermediaries stand to gain from
this policy, since the loss of profits due to reduced demand is compensated both by the
terms-of-trade effect and from the lowering of the domestic deposit rates. The following
theorem shows that this feature is not a specific property of the example but holds more
generally.
Theorem 2. Let e0 = 1, e1 = 1 initially, and suppose that e1 is changed to a value
e′1 < 1 by exchange rate intervention in the home country. Then the following holds:
(i) If in period 1, there is a unique equilibrium in the market at t = 1 for any initial
allocation of the goods among the consumers in each country, then the country as a whole
is worse off after the intervention.
(ii) Assume that the mapping z → f ′(z)z is concave. Then the income of the financial
intermediary in the home country will increase as a result of the intervention.
Proof: (i) Assume to the contrary that there is an exchange rate intervention with
e1 < 1 which results in a Pareto improvement for the home country. Then aggregate
production is fˆ(ωˆ) in the foreign country and f(z) in the home country, for z ≤ ω, and
this aggregate production corresponds to aggregate demand in the period 1 market. If the
home country is better off, then it would be welfare improving to dispose of part of f(ω)
before the market opens. For this to be true, the support of the set of preferred bundles
at (f(z), fˆ(ωˆ)) must intersect the support of the set of preferred bundles at (f(ω), fˆ(ωˆ)),
and the intersection point would be ain initial endowment for which there are multiple
equilibria, a contradiction.
(ii) Assume that input is changed by the small amount dz < 0 as a result of the
intervention. Then marginal product changes by f ′′(ω) > 0, and the income of the
financial intermediaries is changed by the amount
∂I3
∂z
=
∂
∂z
[(pf ′(z)− q(1 + rD))z] = [pf ′′(z)z + pf ′(z)− q(1 + rD)] < 0
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by our assumptions. Also, the income of the financial intermediaries is increased by the
reduction of the effective deposit rate by
∂I3
∂e1
=
∂I3
∂rD
∂rD
∂e1
= −qze−10 (1 + rˆD) < 0.
If follows that
dI3 =
∂I3
∂z
dz +
∂I3
∂e1
de1 > 0
since dz < 0, de1 < 0.
It might be noticed that the condition in the statement of part (i) of the theorem rules
out the so-called transfer paradox of international trade theory, arising when a transfer of
commodities from one country to another before trading takes place will result in greater
welfare after trade to the country which gave up the commodities. In our simple model
this transfer paradox is closely connected to the problem of uniqueness of equilibria.
As mentioned in the beginning of the section, the way in which we treat the factor
markets in the present version of our model may not be quite satisfactory, since we assume
competitive behavior in the market but still accept – and even need – that not all the
endowment is sold. We therefore consider a slightly different, and theoretically more
coherent, version of the model in the next section.
4. Allowing for trade in factors
It might be interesting to investigate whether this conclusion can be upheld if we allow
for trade in factors, assuming the latter to be physically identical in the two countries. In
this case we loosen the connection between factor use and final production in each separate
country; factors unemployed in one country may be used by the producers of the other
country.
Assuming that the factors of the two countries are physically identical, the possibility
of trade means that there will be a common price (except for exchange rate differences)
and only one market to be cleared at t = 0. Though technically simpler, the change in the
model means that the market balancing conditions in (iv) above needs a reformulation;
introducing notation z, zˆ for factor input in the two countries, the new equilibrium condition
becomes
3∑
i=1
xi1 +
3∑
i=1
xˆi1 = f(z),
3∑
i=1
xi2 +
3∑
i=1
xˆi2 = fˆ(zˆ), z + zˆ = ω + ωˆ.
We refer to the appendix for a discussion of existence of equilbrium.
Example 3. Let us examine the workings of the model specified in Example 2 under
the new conditions. We investigate a situation where factor use z in the home country
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is down at 0.9 (as in Example 2) but where the remaining amount 0.1 is inserted in the
foreign country, so that zˆ = 1.1. This may be equilibrium production levels in the case
where e0 = 1 and
e1 =
√
0, 9√
1, 1
= 0.90453.
We need to analyse the situation in the two countries separately depending on whether
anticipated demand is greater or smaller than production at the profit maximizing loan
rate. Starting with the foreign country and assuming that the common factor price at t = 0
is q = 1, we can find the commodity price pˆ from (5), which now becomes
1
4
zˆ−
1
2 =
e−11
pˆ
,
which gives pˆ = 3.79472.
Now we return to the home country; since e1 is a real exchange rate, we have
p = pˆ = 3.7947, and as in Example 2, we find the loan rate rL from (1), which gives
rL = 3.7947 · (2
√
0.9)−1 − 1 = 1.
From the arbitrage equation (4) we have that rD = −0.09547, and we can now find the
incomes as
I1 = 3.7947 ·
√
0.9− 2 · 0.9 = 3.6− 1.8 = 1.8, I2 = 0.90453, I3 = 0.985887.
Notice that in the present case, the sum of the incomes received in the three sectors exceeds
the value of the production in period 1; this is a consequence of the trade in factors, whereby
home country factor owners earn part of there incomes from selling factors abroad.
We see that although all incomes have fallen as compared with the benchmark case in
Example 1, they have not fallen in equal proportions. Indeed, the income of the financial
intermediaries have remained almost unchanged. Taken together with the fact that prices
of consumption goods have fallen, we see that this sector of the economy has experienced
an increase in real incomes.
It should come as no big surprise that we get a result close to that of the previous
section, and again it is not connected with the specific example but holds under rather weak
assumptions on preferences and technology. Indeed, the same mechanism is at work here
as in the previous section; financial intermediaries gain from the lower real interest rate
even though the reduction in demand prevent full exploitation of the monopoly position
in the domestic credit market. The new feature here is that factor owners are held free of
losses since the factor demand is unchanged.
The result stated in Theorem 2(ii) carries over to the present case with indentical
formulation and proof.
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Theorem 3. Let e0 = 1, e1 = 1 initially, and suppose that e1 is changed to a value
e′1 < 1 by exchange rate intervention in the home country. If the mapping z → f ′(z)z is
concave, then the income of the financial intermediary in the home country will increase
as a result of the intervention.
For the first part, the situation is less clear, since trade in factors means that the country
derives income from other sources than production of the commodity. For this reason the
counterpart of Theorem 2(i) is left out in the statement below.
5. Concluding remarks
In the previous sections, we have considered a simple model of international trade and
finance, where real exchange rate appreciation may be advantageuous for some income
receivers even if it is disadvantageous for the country as a whole. The fact that the agents
in society who stand to gain from the policy are those belonging to the financial sector
may shed point to a reason that such policies – or rather policies which in our simplistic
model takes this form – seems to be advocated for developing countries both by influencial
councellors, domestic as well as foreign.
It goes without saying that what has been presented is at most a collection of thought-
provoking examples, not a finished model. For this we would need to extend the model
from the two-period framework considered here to an open-ended model, presumable with
overlapping generations, in which the different generations will experience the exchange
rate appreciation in different ways. We have preferred to present the simple story here
in order to have as few disturbing side effects as possible. This is also the reason that
uncertainty has been left out, although uncertainty in some form seems to be the a necessary
precondition for existence of financial intermediaries of the form considered here rather
than ordinary competitive bond markets.
Clearly, the key to our results is that the financial intermediaries are not organized as a
perfectly competitive industry but exhibit some kind of imperfect competition, here taken
in the extreme form of monopoly. Thus, what really distinguishes the present approach
is our insistence on analyzing trade under conditions which are not the usual competitive
markets that typically are underlying the macroeconomic approach to international finance.
A more detailed exploration of the implications following from the explicit consideration
of such imperfections will be a task for future research.
6. Mathematical appendix: Proof of Theorem 1.
In this section we present a proof of the existence result which appears as Theorem
1. Although the model is an extremely simple one, existence of equilibria is not entirely
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trivial due to the presence of monopolistic behavior by financial intermediaries; as is well
known (see, e.g., Gabszewicz (1999)), such behaviour may occassionally cause problems
in models of general equilibrium. This is however not the case in our model.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let e0, e1 be given; from the assumptions on the technologies
we get that there is a (large) number M > 0 large enough so that if we find an equilibrium
then all prices and interest rates must be numerically smaller than M .
Define the correspondence γ : [0, M ]3 → R2+ and the mapping ξ : [0, M ]3 → R2+
by
γ(p, I, Iˆ) = {(x, xˆ) ∈ R2+ | px + e1pxˆ ≤ I + Iˆ},
ξ(p, I, Iˆ) = {(x, xˆ) ∈ R2+ | (x, xˆ) maximizes U on γ(p, I, Iˆ)}
.
By standard results of equilibrium analysis, xi is continuous. We denote by xˆi the second
component of ξ.
Next, define the mapping ρ : [0, M ]2 → [−M, M ] by
δ(p, q) = min{M, p
q
(f ′(ω) + ωf ′′(ω))− 1}
that is δ(p, q) is the deposit rate solving (5) for z = ω. By our assumptions, ρ is continuous.
Also, we get rˆD from rD = δ(p, q) by the arbitrage equation. Also, define the continuous
maps λ : [0, M ]2 → [−M, M ] by
λ(p, q) =
p
q
f ′(ω)− 1.
Finally, we introduce the mappings Ii[0, M ]2 × [−M, M ]2 given by (3) for income
determination in the home country, let Iˆ = pfˆ(ωˆ) and I(p, q, rL, rD) =
∑3
i=1(1 −
τ)Ii(p, q, rL, rD) for τ ∈ [0, 1].
The correspondence η : [0, 1]× [−M, M ] → [0, 1] is now defined by
η(τ) =
{ {τ ′ | τ ′ > τ} if ξˆ > ωˆ,
{τ ′ | τ ′ < τ} if ξˆ < ωˆ;
this correspondence has an open graph and convex values. By our assumptions on e1,
we have that η(0) consists of all τ ′ > 0, and conversely, if τ = 1, then xˆi < ωˆ so that
η(1) = [0, 1). Now, a connectedness argument assures the existence of a value τ0 for
which η(τ0) = ∅. It is easily seen that at this value of τ0, we have ξˆ = ωˆ, and the support
purchases will secure market balance in the home country as well.
It may be noticed that we prove something slightly stronger than what is formulated
in the theorem, namely that there exist equilibria for any specified fixed values of factor
and commodity prices; this is of course due to the very simplicity of the model, where
consumption takes place only at t = 0 so that time preferences play no role. Also, the
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simple structure of the model is illustrated by the fact that existence follows already by
connectedness arguments, without use of fixed-point theorems. The latter feature is of
course changed if the model is extended to allow for more than one commodity in each
country.
Since existence of equilibria in our model is a rather straightforward consequence of
the assumptions, we shall leave it to the reader to check that the reasoning carries over
with only minor changes to the versions considered in the sections 3 and 4.
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